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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
VAUGHN L. WARR, et al,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
-vs.THE \~AN KLEECK-BACON INVESTMENT COMPANY, and THE VAN
KLEECK MORTGAGE COMPANY,
Defendants and Appellants,
JAY LARSEN,
.
Appellant Oll'ltd Intervener.

Case No. 7872

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS
AND
JAY LARSEN, APPELLANT AND INTERVENER
PRELIMINARY 'STATEMENT
This is an appeal by the Van Kleeck Companies, Defendants and Appellants, and by Jay Larsen, Ap.pellant
and Intervener, from orders entered in the Fourth Judicial District Court, Uintah County, the Honorable R. L.
Tuckett, Judge, presiding, refusing to set aside a default
and default judgment entered in favor of the plaintiffs
against the defendants and refusing to allow Jay Larsen
to intervene in the action.
The action, a suit to have a deed absolute declared
a mortgage and removed as a. cloud on plaintiffs' title, was
instituted by the service of a summons on Don Barr,
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defendants' process agent in Utah, on July 31, 1951 (R.
4). 21 days after service of summons, on August 21, 1951,
defendants' default was entered by plaintiffs (R. 38). Ten
days thereafter or 31 days after service of Summons, on
August 31, 1951, a default judgment was entered against
defendants (R. 5-6).
Upon learning that a default judgment had been
taken against them, defendants took prompt and immediate measures to have the default and default judgment
set aside (R. 9-17). After strenuous and diligent efforts
in ascertaining the facts, retaining Utah counsel and preparing the necessary papers, defendants by motion dated
November 19, 1951, and filed on November 20, 1951,
moved the Court to set aside the entry of default and to
vacate the default judgment and to permit the defendants
to file their answer in the action (R. 9). The motion was
made on the ground that the default and default judgment
had been taken by reason of defendants' mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect, and was based upon
the affidavit of merits of defendants, the Notice of Motion, Affidavits of Ross Bray, Charles A. Baer and Don
Barr attached to the motion, the Answer of defendants
served therewith and all other records in the action (R.
7-9). The motion thus filed on November 20, 1951 was
one day less than three months from the date of entry of
defendants' default in the action. In defendants' answer
attached to the motion, the Court's attention was directed
to the fact that, except for the mineral rights, the land and
water stock involved in the action had in 1942 been conveyed by Warranty Deed to Jay Larsen (R.19) by virtue
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3
of a contract to purchase the property dated ~larch 3,
1938 (R. 20-21), and asserted as a defense to the action
that Jay Larsen as such fee owner and in possession had
not been joined by plaintiffs as a necessary and indispensable party defendant to the action (R. 22).
The above motion of defendants was heard by the
Court on December 14, 1951 and taken under advisement
(R. 54). By a ruling dated at Provo, Utah, April26, 1952,
and filed ~lay 13, 1952, the Court denied defendants' motion to set aside the judgment and found that defendants
had failed to show that their failure to answer was due to
mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect (R.
31).
Thereafter, three additional motions were filed in the
action. On ~iay 23, 1952, defendants filed a supplemental
motion to set aside the entry of default and to vacate the
default judgment and to dismiss the action, or in lieu
thereof to permit the defendants to file their answer in
the action, upon the grounds that Jay Larsen, defendants'
grantee of the surface rights and water stock, and c·arter
Oil Company, defendants' lessee of the oil, gas and mineral rights, were necessary and indispensable parties
defendant to the action and that such deed and lease were
of record and in the abstract and personally known to
plaintiffs prior to the commencement of the action (R. 3237).
On May 23, 1952, Jay Larsen filed a motion to have
the Court set aside the default judgment entered against
defendants and for leave to intervene in the action as a
party defendant and for leave to file his answer in the
action upon the grounds that, except for the mineral
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rights, he was the fee owner of the land and water stock
involved in the action, holding under Warranty Deed
from the defendants which deed had been recorded on
October 29, 1942, in Book No. 33, Page No. 300, Uintah
County records; that he had not learned of the action nor
of the default judgment until May, 1952; that the Court's
decree vesting title of the land and water stock in plaintiffs in effect constituted the assertion by plaintiffs of an
adverse interest against him as the lawful owner in possession of the property, except the mineral rights, and
that the default judgment was void in its entirety in that
he, an indispensable party to the action, had never been
given any opportunity or notice to appear and be joined
in the action (R. 39-41).
By motion dated May 24, 1952 and filed on May 26,
1952 defendants moved the Court to reconsider its ruling
dated April 26, 1952, and filed on May 13, 1952, denying
defendants' motion to set aside the default and default
judgment, on the basis of the facts contained in the additional affidavits of H. M. Snyder, Sheriff of Uintah
County, Don Barr, Cashier of the Bank of Vernal, and
N.J. Meagher, President of the Bank of Vernal, attached
to the motion (R. 44-48).
The three motions described above were heard by the
Court on June 11, 1952 at Provo, Utah, and the matter
taken under advisement (R. 56). By ruling dated July
12, 1952, and filed on July 16, 1952, the Court denied defendants' motion to have the Court reconsider its prior
ruling and, in view of the plaintiffs' offer in open court
to tender Jay Larsen a quit claim deed to the surface
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rights of the land involved, also denied the Inotion of
Jay Larsen to set aside the default judgment and to intervene in the suit (R. 55). The above offer of a quit claim
deed by plaintiffs \Yas rejected by counsel in open Court
on behalf of Jay Larsen. Jay Larsen continues in his refusal to accept such deed and insists upon his right to
intervene in the action and have the default judgment
set aside so that the Court upon a trial of the merits can
sever the mineral rights from the surface rights and
water stock and either upon proof or by plaintiffs' disclaimer, confirm and recognize his ownership and right
to possession of such surface rights and water stock under
and by virtue of his Warranty Deed from defendants.
Defendants filed their Notice of Appeal on June 12,
1952, from the Court's order entered on May 13, 1952,
denying defendants' motion of November 20, 1951.
On August 12, 1952, the defendants and Jay Larsen
together filed a Notice of Appeal from the Court's order
entered on July 16, 1952, denying defendants' supplemental motions and the motion of Jay Larsen to set aside the
judgment and to intervene in the action.
By stipulation between the parties and Jay Larsen,
approved by order signed by Mr. Justice McDonough of
this Court, both Notices of Appeal are in effect consolidated together as one case on appeal.
STATEMENT OF. F'ACTS
The Colorado National Bank, Denver, Colorado, is
testamentary trustee of the Van Kleeck Estate and in
this capacity represents the controlling interest of the de-
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fendant VanKleeck Companies (R. 16). Charles A. Baer,
Assistant Trust Officer of the Bank, is an officer of both
companies (R. 14). Both companies were organized under
the laws of Colorado (R. 14). Ross Bray, an associate
for many years of the late Mr. Van Kleeck, is likewise
an officer of both companies (R. 10).
Over 30 years ago, namely, by Warranty Deed acknowledged May 14, 1921, and recorded on May 24, 1921,
in Book No. 23, Page Nos. 102-3, Uintah County records,
the defendant Van Kleeck-Bacon Investment Company
acquired title from the father and mother of plaintiffs
to the following described land and water stock located
in Uintah County:
Lots One and Two, and the East half of the Northwest quarter of Section 19, Township 1 South of
Range One East of the Uintah Special Meridian,
containing 160.84 acres, more or less;
160 shares of the capital stock of the Big Six Irrigation Company. (R. 19).
A photostatic copy of this deed appears in the record
(R. 24-5). The deed on its face states: "This deed is not
intended as a mortgage" (R. 24). This Warranty Deed
was given in lieu of foreclosure proceedings and in extinguishment of a debt in the face amount· of $3,500.00,
represented by a note dated April 22, 1920, in the amount
of $2,500.00 and a note dated April 23, 1920 in the amount
of $1,000.00 signed by Joseph F. W arr and Elizabeth
Warr, father and mother of plaintiffs, payable and effected in Denver, Colorado, in favor of the defendant,
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\''"an Kleeck ~lortgage Company (R. 30). No part of
either principal or interest on such indebtedness was ever
paid by the W arrs to either of the defendant companies
(R. 30). The notes were secured by two mortgages on
the above land and water stock, aggregating $3,500.00,
and the conveyance from plaintiff's father and mother to
the defendant, \Tan Kleeck-Bacon Investment Company,
'vas made subject to such mortgages (R. 24). The mortgages and debt were released of record several years
later in 1938 at the time Jay Larsen contracted to purchase the surface rights and water stock from the defendant companies.
At the time the aforesaid Warranty Deed was executed and delivered to the defendant, Van Kleeck-Bacon
Investment Company, by plaintiffs' father and mother,
the parties entered into an option and agreement under
which the defendant company agreed to reconvey the
property upon the payment before November 1, 1921 of
all arrears, taxes, water assessments and expenses (R.
30). The Warrs did not exercise their option, paid no
money under the contract, and finally vacated and moved
off the property on December 20, 1922 (R. 21 and R. 30).
No member of the W arr family was ever heard from
again until November 7, 1951, when the defendant companies were shocked to hear of the suit and thereafter
learn that a default judgment had been entered in this
case in favor of the W arr children (R. 30).
After the W arr family vacated and moved off the
premises on December 20, 1922, the defendant company
took possession, leasing the land to various tenants and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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paying all water assessments and taxes continuously on
the land from year to year thereafter until 1938 (R. 1823).
On March 3, 1938 Jay Larsen contracted to purchase
the land and water stock, excepting the mineral rights,
for the sum of $1,000.00, payable in installments (R. 33,
R. 30). Larsen entered into possession at the time of
such contract and has paid all taxes and water assessments on the property since that time (R. 33-34). Upon
final payment of the agreed purchase price and on February 4, 1942, the defendant by Warranty Deed recorded
on October 29, 1942, in Book No. 33, Page No. 300, Uintah
County Records, conveyed the land and water stock, excepting the mineral rights, to Jay Larsen in fee (R. 3940). Jay Larsen has used the land as irrigated pasture
in his cattle and farming operations (R. 33-4).
On March 15, 1951, the defendant companies signed
and executed an oil and gas lease with Carter Oil .Company covering the land in question which lease was thereafter recorded and of record prior to the commencement
of the present action on July 31, 1951 (R. 35). The lease
contains a Warranty of Title by the defendant companies
to the Carter Oil Company (R. 36). Carter Oil Company
assigned the lease to ·stanolind Oil & Gas Company which
Company in turn assigned the lease to Phillips Petroleum Company (R. 35). The aforesaid assignments were
of record prior to the commencement of the present action
on July 31, 1951 ( R. 35). On June 23, 1951, plain tiffs executed a document with Carter Oil Company ratifying
defendants' oil and gas lease with the same force and
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9
effect as if plaintiffs had been na1ned as Lessors therein
(R. 35). No notice of such ratification or assertion of adverse interest in the property by plaintiffs was given to
defendant con1panies, either by plaintiffs or by Carter
Oil Company or by anyone else (R. 35). It is admitted
that Carter Oil Company paid a bonus of $75,000.00 to the
defendant companies for executing the aforesaid oil and
gas lease.
Immediately prior to the execution of the Carter
oil and gas lease on March 15, 1951, it became necessary
because of deaths of former agents to appoint a new
process agent for defendant companies in Utah (R. 30).
At the suggestion of the Colorado National Bank,
the defendant companies selected and appointed as their
process agent in the State of Utah, Don Barr, Cashier of
the Bank of Vernal. The Bank of Vernal was the correspondent bank in Vernal, Utah, of the Colorado National Bank (R. 30-Baer deposition). He was carefully
selected after discussions with various officers of the
Colorado bank because he was situated in Vern,al, was
cashier of the bank and was a young man (R. 30). Don
Barr, early in March, 1951, accepted the appointment as
process agent in Utah for the defendant companies (R.
26-29, R. 53, R. 46). He was given no specific instructions
concerning his duties as process agent, nor was there any
need to give any such instructions, for he clearly understood that his only duty was to forward to the offices of
the defendant companies in Denver, Colorado, any papers
served on him pertaining to the Van Kleeck Companies
(R. 46, 26-29).
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On July 31, 1951, sometime during the working day,
H. M. Snyder, Sheriff of Uintah County, walked into the
Bank of Vernal for the purpose of serving the summons
and complaint in this action on Don Barr, the defendants'
process agent in Utah (R. 45). At the time Barr was working behind the second teller's window on the left as you go
in the main entrance of the bank (R. 45). The Sheriff
walked up to the window and speaking through the cage
said he had some papers for him (R. 45). Barr asked
what they were and the Sheriff gave the papers to him
indorsing the service on them at the time (R. 45). According to the Sheriff's clear recollection, Don Barr handed
the papers back and said "These papers are not for me";
"There must be some mistake, these papers are for
Vaughn Warr, not Don Barr." (R. 45). The Sheriff
pushed the papers back and said he was going to leave
them nevertheless (R.45).
Sheriff Snyder, in his affidavit (R. 45) stated:
"I have a clear recollection of the incident and
there is no doubt in my mind whatsoever that Don
Barr made an honest mistake in misapprehending
the import of the papers being served upon him because of the close similarity between the name
Vaughn W arr and his own name, Don Barr." (R.
45).
Mr. N. J. Meagher, President of the Bank of Vernal,
was in the Bank on the day the Sheriff came in. After the
Sheriff left he walked over and said to Mr. Barr: "Don,
what were those papers the Sheriff brought in~" Mr.
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Barr replied: '~There w·as son1e mistake. The papers did
not pertain to me or the Bank. They 'vere for a man by
the nan1e of Warr." (R. -!7). Thir. Meagher likewise affirmed that :\Ir. Barr as Cashier had always discharged
his duties in a highly conscientous, careful, prudent and
competent manner (R. -!7).
Don Barr himself affinns that but for his mistake in
apprehending that the papers in the action were intended
for ,~aughn "\"\Tarr rather than himself, by reason solely
of the similarity in the two names, and if he had noticed
or had his attention called to the Van Kleeck names, it
would have immediately recalled to mind his appointment,
approximately four and one-half months earlier, as
process agent for the Van Kleeck companies and he would
have immediately forwarded such papers to the Companies in Denver, Colorado (R. 46). At the time of service
he did not remember or have his appointment sp·ecifically
in mind (R. 53) but the fact of such appointment would
have been immediately recalled to mind if he had seen,
or had his attention called to the Van Kleeck name and if
he had not made the honest mistake of thinking that the
papers were meant for Vaughn Warr instead of Don
Barr (R. 46). Whatever happened to the papers nobody knows; they did not turn up· at the bank or elsewhere
(R. 26-29).
21 days after the service as aforesaid, plaintiffs
entered defendants' default (R. 38). Ten days later, upon
the sole testimony of plaintiffs' counsel, the Court
found that the Warranty Deed from plaintiffs' father and
mother under which both defendants, as grantee, and
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Jay Larsen, as defendants' grantee, claim their respective
interests, was not a deed but an unforeclosed mortgage,
outlawed by the Statutes of Limitation of Utah (R. 5-6).
By the judgment, the Court decreed:
"1. That the plaintiffs are the owners and entitled to the possession of the following described
realty and water stock in Uintah County, State
of Utah, to-wit:
Lots One and Two and the East half of the
Northwest quarter of S.ection 19, Township
1 South, of Range 1 East, of the Uintah Special Meridian ; and all petroleum and mineral
rights therein ; and
160 shares of the capital stock of the Big Six
Irrigation Company." (R. 5).
By paragraph 5 of the judgment, plaintiffs were
awarded their costs of Court (R. 6). The Court likewise
found that the mortgage and conveyance were void because the defendants were non-qualified Colorado corporations doing business in Utah (R. 5-6). This was not
the fact (R. 18-23).
Plaintiffs in their complaint, although alleging that
the deed was a mortgage whose foreclosure was outlawed
by the statute of limitations, made no offer to pay any
sum against the unpaid mortgage debt or interest. They
made no offer to pay any of the taxes or water assessments which have been paid on the property for 30 years.
They made no offer to pay for any improvements on the
property (R. 2-3). In their complaint, plaintiffs did not
ask the Court to decree that they were the owners and
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entitled to the possession of the n1ineral rights only;
they alleged in paragraph 4 of their con1plaint that they
'vere the owners and entitled to the possession of the entire interest in the 160.84 acres, as described, and 160
shares of the capital stock of the Big 'Six Irrigation Company (R. 2). In their prayer, they asked:
~-1.

That the plaintiffs be declared to he the
O"\v""D.ers of the above described realty and water
stock;" (R. 3).
The default judgment conformed with this prayer
for relief and vested complete ·and entire ownership in the
realty and water stock in plaintiffs (R. 5). The cause of
action was single and indivisible; the judgment was single
and indivisible (R. 3-5).
Both at the time of the commencement of the action
on July 31, 1951, and on August 31, 1951, when the hearing was held and the default judgment entered by the
Court, plaintiffs knew both personally and from the abstract of title introduced in evidence, that Jay Larsen
was the record owner and in p·ossession of the land, excepting the mineral rights, and the water stock as well.
They also knew of defendants' lease to Carter Oil Company of the mineral rights, and of the assignments of such
lease (R. 32-7, R. 39-41). Although Jay Larsen, Big Six
Irrigation Company, Carter Oil Company, and its assignees, were and are all available for service of process in
this action, no effort was made to join them in the action
notwithstanding their known interests in the property
(R. 32-7). At no time from December 20, 1922, when the
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Warr family actually vacated and moved off the premises,
until November 7, 1951, when John Cook of the Carter
Oil Company happened to advise Ross Bray in Denver of
the suit (R. 11) did the plaintiffs or any member of the
W arr family ever at any time assert any adverse interest
or claim any interest whatsoever in the property against
the defendant companies or against Jay Larsen, the defendants' grantee of the surface rights and water stock
(R. 30, 33, 40).
The defendant companies, upon first being apprised
of the suit on November 7, 1951, took immediate and vigorous steps to have the default and default judgment set
aside (R. 10-17). Jay Larsen, on hearing of the suit for
the first time in May, 1952, likewise took immediate steps
to intervene in the action and protect his interest in the
property under and by virtue of his Warranty Deed from
defendants (R. 39-41).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Two primary questions are presented to this Court
for determination. The first is whether the District
Court erred in refusing to grant the timely motion of defendants to set aside the default and default judgment
by ruling that the" honest mistake of Don Barr was inexcusable. The second question is whe.ther the default
judgment should have been set aside by the District Court
because necessary and indispensable parties to the action
were not joined and were not permitted to join in the
action. Although we respectfully suggest that the District
Court's rulings should clearly be, reversed on both .
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grounds 'Ye take up first for discussion the well-established principle that the non-joinder of necessary and indispensable parties requires a reversal of the District
Court's rulings in the circumstances of this case.
POINT I
A DEFAULT JUDGMENT MUST BE SET ASIDE WHEN,
BY TIMELY MOTION, THE FACT THAT A NECESSARY
AND INDISPENSABLE PARTY HAS NOT BEEN JOINED
IN THE ACTION IS BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF
THE COURT.
NATURE OF THE CASE

The present action instituted by plaintiffs is in the
nature of an equitable action to cancel or set aside a deed
absolute on the ground that the deed was in fact a mortgage \\~hose foreclosure by the n1ortgagee was outlawed
by the provisions of Sections 104-2-6 and 104-2-22 of the
Utah Statutes of Limitation and was void because the
defendants were not at the time their interests were acquired qualified to do business in Utah. Plaintiffs' cause
of action sought to invalidate in its entirety the recorded
warranty deed of their father and mother executed and
delivered in 1921, over 30 years ago, which conveyed in
fee simple 160.84 acres of land located in Uintah County
and 160 shares of the capital stock of the Big Six Irrigation Company. These allegations were made notwithstanding that the deed on its face stated "This deed is not
intended as a mortgage" and notwithstanding that the
deed was executed and delivered not to secure but to extinguish the mortgage indebtedness in lieu of foreclosure
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proceedings. The deed itself was made subject to the two
earlier mortgages executed by plaintiffs' father and
mother and these mortgages were later released of record
in 1938.
Plaintiffs, even on their theory that the deed was a
1nortgage, made no offer to pay any part of the mortgage
debt or interest thereon and made no offer to pay up any
part of the 30 years of back taxes and water assessments
which have been paid by defendants and Jay Larsen, nor
did they offer to pay for any of the improvements which
have now made the land extremely valuable for its use
alone as irrigated pasture.
Plaintiffs alleged and the Court decreed that the deed
in its entirety was "only of the nature of a mortgage"
and as such void and outlawed. By judgment of the Court
the en tire fee ownership of the 160.84 acres of the described realty and 160 shares of the capital stock of the
Big 'Six Irrigation Company was vested in plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs' cause of action did not sever the mineral rights
from the land and water stock, nor did the Court's judgment.
Plaintiffs knew when they filed the action on July 31,
1951 and their counsel knew 30 days later when he testified in the action and the Court signed the default judgment, that Jay Larsen was in possession and the record
fee owner of the described land and water stock, excepting
the mineral rights, and they likewise knew that defendants had previously divested themselves by lease to the
Carter Oil Company of the oil, gas and mineral rights.
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Notwithstanding that the deed to Jay Larsen and
the lease to Carter Oil Company were both known to
plaintiffs, they n1ade no effort to join either in the action.
In fact, a fe"" days before instituting the action against
defendants, plaintiffs attempted to get Carter Oil Company out of the picture by adopting and ratifying defendants~ oil and gas lease with that Company. This maneuver, unknown to defendants, eliminated the possibility
of Carter Oil Company's insisting on intervening in the
action to uphold its oil and gas lease from defendants. It
also left Carter Oil Company in the position where, unless
the Court requires it to be joined, it can now sit back
in a neutral position and attempt to recover the $75,000.00 paid to defendants if the present default judgment
is allowed to stand.
Jay Larsen, as defendants' grantee of the surface
rights and water stock, however, was not eliminated
from the picture by plaintiffs prior to the commencement
of the action. Although known to be the fee owner of
record of the surface rights and water stock he was not
joined as a party to the action. He holds 160.84 acres
of irrigated pasture and the 160 shares of stock in the Big
Six Irrigation Company under warranty deed from a
grantee whose deed by default judgment in this action
has in its entirety been declared null and void. His chain
of title, with one link out, has been rendered unmerchantable by the Courts' judgment. A quit claim deed from
these plaintiffs, he thinks, is a poor substitute for a court
decree. He insists upon his right not in an independent
action, but in this action, to have the Court's judgment
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set aside and modified to recognize his fee ownership in
the surface and water stock. He does not think that the
Court should cloud his title by formal judgment and then
without permitting him to be a party to the action atternpt to force him to accept a quit claim deed from these
plain tiffs.
The truth of this case is somewhat about as follows:
The W arr children somehow or other got wind that this
tract of land which their father and mother had deeded
away 30 years ago was now one of the most valuable
tracts of oil land in the Roosevelt Pool. Without having
asserted any claim whatsoever against the property for
30 years they took the blind chance of acquiring some
interest by filing suit. By a peculiar, if not incredible,
series of circumstances default judgment resulted in their
favor. Fortunately for defendants Don Barr is not the
only one who made a mistake in this action. Plaintiffs
made the mistake of not joining Jay Larsen as a party
defendant as the authorities hereafter cited clearly
demonstrate.
WHO ARE PROPER, NECESSARY AND INDISPENSABLE
PARTIES

The new Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, expressing
old law, classify parties into p,roper, necessary and indispensable parties. Both in the Federal Courts and in this
State:
(a) Proper parties are those who may be
joined in the action at the discretion of plaintiff.
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(b) Necessary parties are those who should
be present and joined in the action and without
'vhon1 the Court n1a-y not proceed except where
··jurisdiction over them can be acquired only by
their consent or vollmtary appearace."
(c) Ind-ispensable parties are those who
must be present and joined in the action.
See: 65 Harvard La\v Review at page 1050; Washington v. United States, 87 F'. (2d) 421, (CCA9) (1936):
"The absence of an 'indispensable' party is
fatal to the maintenance of a suit. The Court normally will dismiss even where it is impossible to
bring the absent person before the Court, or where
his joinder would destroy jurisdiction. Thus the
requirement of joining indispensable parties may
not only permanently deprive the plaintiff of a
federal forum, but also prevent recovery in any
court." 65 H.L.R. 1050.
Under Rule 19(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, it is provided that "persons having a joint interest
shall be made parties and be joined on the same side as
plaintiffs or defendants." This rule is, of course, subject
to the provision of Rule 23 relating to "class actions"
which has no applicability to the present situation.
Furthermore, Rule 19 (b) reads as follows:
"(b) Effect of Failure to Join. When pe.rsons who are not indispensable, but who ought to
be parties if complete relief is to be accorded between those already parties, have not been made
parties and are subject to the jurisdiction of the
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Court as to service of process, the court shall
order them summoned to appear in the action.
The Court in its discretion may proceed in the
action without making such persons parties, if its
jurisdiction over them can be acquired only by
their consent or voluntary appearance; but the
judgment rendered therein does not affect the
rights or liabilities of absent persons." (Italics
supplied.)

Subsection (c) of Rule 19 likewise provides :
" (c) Same: Names of Omitted Persons and
Reasons for Non-Joinder to be Pleaded: In any
pleading in which relief is asked, the pleader shall
set forth the names, if known to him, or persons
who ought to be parties if complete relief is to be
accorded between those already parties, but who
are not joined, and shall state why they are omitted."
Again, Rule 21,' entitled "1\tlisjoinder and NonJoinder of Parties" provides in part:
"Misjoinder of parties is not ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or
added by order of the Court on motion of any
party or of its own initiative at any stage of the
action and on such terms as are just."
The above Utah Rules were taken from the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and show clearly that there can
be no dispensing with indispensable parties as the following commenta.ry shows. The commentary is taken from
Vol. 6 of the Cyclopedia of F·ederal Procedure, 2nd Edition:
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Para. 2135 states :
~·It

has been said the Rule 19 attempts to give
some definitions to the distinction between indis~
pensable parties and necessary parties, and that
the distinction between 'necessary' and 'indis pen . .
sable' parties is recognized in Rule 19 (b) of the
new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It is ob"'7
vious, however, that the rule does not purport to
define the distinctions." (Citing cases.)
Para. 2136

states:·~
'.

"The fundamental importance of . indispensable parties from a procedural standpoint is reflected in the well-settled general rule, necessarily
as true since the advent ~f the. F·ederal Rules of
Civil Procedure as before, that where an indis.:.
pensable party is absent the court may not grant
any relief. Consequently, in the absence of indispensable parties dismissal of the suit is proper."
( Citllig cases.)
It is therefore clearly established law that ~he absence 9f an indispensable party is fatal to the ~ainten,
ance of a suit and when brought to the attention of the
Court requires either a complete dismissal of the suit
and the vacation of any judgment rendered therein or the
indispensable party must be joined so that the court
may proceed with the action.

.

"The rules of indisp·ensability have been formulated largely to protect an absent interested
person or the defendant. The defendant may protect in his ·own interest; even where he cannot
object in his qwn right, he. may rely on the interest of the absent person." (65 HLR 1050).
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The only exception to this rule is where the person to
be protected, by his own inequitable conduct, is precluded
from raising the objection. Examples of this are where
the defendant and the absentee conspire to suppress the·
fact of indispensability from the Court or where the
defendant had sworn that certain persons had no interest he could not thereafter raise the issue of their indispensability. This exception obviously had no application
to the present situation.
The test for determining indispensability is still
that laid down in Shields v. Barrow in 1855, 17 How. 130,
by the United States Supre·me Court, where it was stated
that indispensable parties are
"Persons who not only have an interest in the
controversy, but an interest of such a nature that
a final decree cannot be made without either affecting that interest, or leaving the controversy in
such a condition that its final termination may
be wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience."
In Houst.on Real Estate Investment Compa;n;y v.
Hechler, 44 Utah 64 (1914) the Supreme Court of Utah
st~ated as follows: (page 78)
"In view of what has been said, we feel constrained to hold that, where A's property is attached in an action by B against C, A, as a m~atteT
of right, may intervene in B's action, and in that
action have determined his right to or interest
in the property."
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ARE GRANTEES AND LESSEES OF RECORD PRIOR TO
THE CO:\IMENCEI\'IENT OF AN ACTION NECESSARY AND
INDISPENSABLE PARTIES?

The authorities clearly establish that a defendant's
vendee and lessee are necessary and indispensable partie~
to the action.
\v~ith respect to the general principle involved, we
refer first to the case of Shields v. Barrow, 17 How. 130
(1855 ), 'vhich involved a situation where a vendor had
sold certain plantations and slaves to a citizen of Louisi-.
ana for $227,000. He received payments aggregating
about $107,000. Some of the notes being unpaid, the vendor instituted an action against the vendee. This action
was settled by the vendor agreeing to take the property
back upon the payment of an additional sum of money
which was secured by the notes of six individuals, four of
whom lived in Louisiana, and two in Mississippi. Becoming dissatisfied with this arrangement the vendor instituted suit seeking to have this settlement agreement set
aside and to have his rights under the original agreement restored. The two Mississippi residents only were
joined as defendants, the vendee and his four indorsers
all from Louisiana not being joined.
Mr. Justice Curtis stated; p-age 139 and 140:
"The contract of compromise was .one entire
subject, and from its nature could not be rescinded,
so far as respected two of the parties to it, and
allowed to stand as to the others. Thomas R.
Shields, the principal, and four out of six of his
indorsers, being citizens of Louisiana, could not be
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made defendants in this suit; yet each of them was
an indispensable party to a bill for the rescission
of the contract. Neither the act of congress of
February 28, 1839, (5 Stat. at Large, 321, par. 1)
nor the 47th rule for the equity practice of the
circuit courts of the United States, enables a circuit court to make a decree in equity, in the absence of an indispensable party, whose rights
Inust necessarily be affected by such decree. * * *"
''A bill to rescind a contract affords an example of this kind. For, if only a part of those
interested in the contract are before the court, a
decree of rescission must either destroy the rights
of those who are absent, or leave the contract in
full force as respects them; while it is set aside,
and the contracting parties restored to their former condition, as to the others. We do not say that
no case can arise in which this may be done; but
it must be a case in which the rights of those before
the court are completely separable from the rights
of those absent, otherwise the latter are indispensable parties."

In United States v. Central Pacific R. Co., 11 Fed.
449 (1882) the United States brought a suit against the
railroad to vacate certain patents on the ground of mistake in the issuance of the patents to the railroad as a
part of its land grant. The action was dismissed because
the defendant's grantees were indispensable parties and
had not been joined in the action.
The court (per Sawyer, C.J.) stated:

"* * * there is another point upon which the
present bill must be dismissed, as to all the lands
and patents in question. The Central Pacific Rail-
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road Company is the only defendant, and before
the filing of the bill it had conveyed all the lands
in question and ceased to have any interest in the
subject-matter in controversy. Not a person who
had any interest in the n1atter in controversy
when the bill was filed has been made a party to
this suit. The court is asked to vacate patents to
large quantities of land held by numerous parties
under these patents without anybody having an interest in the lands being a party to the suit. The
parties in interest are not only proper but indispensable parties. No decree can be rendered annulling or affecting the title of parties to land
without their presence. They are entitled to their
day in court. Shields v. Barrow, 17 How. 130;
Coiron v. Millandon, 19 How. 113; Barney v. Baltimore City, 6 Wall. 285; Rib on v. Railroad Co.,
16 Wall 450 ; Railroad Co. v. Orr, 18 Wall. 475. The
defendant in this suit, having no interest in the
subject-matter involved, is not even a necessary,
if a proper, party to the bill to annul the P'a tents.
To vacate the patents on this bill would be very
much like foreclosing a mortgage upon lands, in a
suit against a mortgagor not person,ally liable for
the debt secured, after he has conveyed the mortgaged lands, without making the owner of the
lands a party. All the indispensable parties are
omitted from the bill, and those not necessary to
be made parties are sued."
In New Mexico v. Lane, 243 U.S. 52 (1917), the State
of New Mexico brought a suit against the Secretary of the
Interior and the Commissioner of the General Land Office
asking that a tract of land which the Interior Department
had awarded ·and sold as coal land to an entryman under
the coal land law be decreed to be the property of the
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State under the school-land grant and that the issuance
of a patent to the entryman be enjoined.
The Supreme Court of the United ·states dismissed
the suit on grounds which included the fact that the entryman, having vurchased the land and paid the price was
an indispensable party to the granting of the relief
prayed.
Mr. Justice McKenna stated, p. 58:
"It would seem, besides, that under the averments of the bill Keepers is an indispensable
party, he having become, according to the bill,
a purchaser of the land and paid the purchase
price thereof."
In South Penn Oil Co. v. Miller, 175 F'ed. 729 (1909)
the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held
that a court cannot adjudicate rights unde-r conflicting
oil leases of the same property, executed by different lesso-rs, and each providing for the payment of royalties,
in a suit between the lessees to which the lessors are not
parties. The Court, speaking through Judge Goff, stated:
"We also think the record discloses the fact
that parties absolutely essential to the proper disposition of the questions decided by the court below were not before it, and that consequently, even
had the subject-matter of the controversy been
properly within its jurisdiction, the court could
not have· effectively disposed of it. Neither the
lessors of the complainants, nor of the defendants,
were made parties to the suit, and yet the final
decree disposed of the funds in which they were
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interested, and decided the title to the property
'vhich they claim to own in fee simple. It takes
fron1 the one and gives to the other set of claimants portions of the land clain1ed, respe-ctively, by
those not made parties. It adjudges that the complaintants are the o"11ers, by virtue of their leases
for oil and gas, of the real property in dispute that
is located to the west of a certain line, although
such property is claimed in fee simple by the lessors of the South Penn Oil Company, who were
not permitted to defend their titles. The receiver
is directed to turn over to the complainants the
oil \veils on the land so situated west of that line,
thereby giving to complainants' lessors the royalty due from said wells, which is also claimed by the
lessors of the defendant the South Penn Oil Company. And, again, the South Penn Oil Company is
adjudged to be the owner of the wells found to be
on the east side of said line, on land the title to
which is claimed by the lessors of complainants,
who are thereby deprived of the royalties due
from the wells so given to the South Penn Oil
Company. Clearly, these lessors are not deprived
of their rights, or bound by said decre-e; nor are
they estopped by it from litigating to protect their
interests. Evidently the. decree of the court below could not finally and effectually dispose of
the controversy, as the lessors referred to were
indispensable parties, and those claiming under it
would hold defective titles."
In United States v. Bean, 253 F'ed. 1 (1918), the
United States brought a suit against G. E. Bean, County
Treasurer of Seminole County, Oklahoma, to enjoin and
prevent the County Treasurer from selling and conveying
certain lands for delinquent taxes which had been allotted
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and formerly owned by the Seminole Nation or Tribe of
Indians. The government contended that under the Federal laws these lands were inalienable save on approval
of the· court. The Circuit Court of Appeals speaking
through Judge 'Sanborn dismissed the action upon the
ground that the purchasers of the lands from the County
Treasurer were indispensable and had not been joined
as parties to the action.
"From the complaint and the decree the facts
conclusively appear that this suit has been commenced, prosecuted, and a decree has been rendered against the party who has no real interest in
the property in litigation, and that none of the· real
parties in interest adverse to the claim of the complainant have been made parties to the suit, or
have appeared or been heard therein. The taxes
of which complaint is made have been levied,
the lands upon which they were levied have been
sold to pay them, certificates of the sales thereof
have been executed and delivered, the· certificates
and any liens they evidence are held either by the
county, or by other purchasers at the sales, or
from the county, or by their successors in interest;
but neitheT the county (Revised Laws Oklahoma,
sec. 1501), nor any of the purchasers at the sales,
nor any of the holders of the certificates of sales,
are parties to this suit, and as they have not been
made parties, and have not been heard, or had any
op·portunity to be heard in this suit, nothing that
the court below has adjudged and nothing that this
court has decided herein is or can be binding upon
them, or upon any parties claiming under them, or
even upon the court below, or upon this court,
when, if ever, the claims, rights, and interests of.
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these parties who are not present in either of the
courts are presented by them for adjudication.
"But the decree, by its terms, annuls their
certificates, destroys the liens they claim, removes
all these as clouds upon the titles, without any
notice to or hearing by them, and this decree
doubtless has been, or, if permitted to stand, will
be, spread upon the records of the titles to these
lands. It cannot fail injuriously to affect-nay,
practically to destroy-the value of the claims and
rights of these holders of certificates, because it
bears on its face no adequate notice that they are
not bound by it. 'The established practice of
courts of equity to dismiss the plaintiff's bill,' says
the Supreme Court, in Minnesota v. Northern
Securities Co., 184 U. S. 199, 235, 22 Sup. Ct. 308,
322 (46 L. Ed. 499), 'if it appears that to grant the
relief prayed for would injuriously affect persons
materially interested in the subject-matter who are
not made parties to the suit, is founded upon clear
reasons, and may be enforced by the court sua
sponte, though not raised by the pleadings or suggested by counsel. Shields v. Barrow, 17 How. 130
(15 L. Ed. 158) Hipp v. Babin, 19 How. 271, 278
(15 L. Ed. 633); Parker v. Winnipiseogee Lake
Cotton & Woolen Co., 2 Black, 545 (17 L. Ed. 333)'
To the same effect is the opinion of this court in
Hawes v. First Nat. Bank, 229 Fed. 51, 57, 59,
143 C. C. A. 645, 651, 653.
"It is a familiar and just rule that no court
may directly adjudicate a person's claim of right,
unless he is actually or constructively before it.
It is an established rule of practice in the conduct
of suits in equity in the federal courts that every
indispensable party must be brought into the court
or the suit must be dismissed. And an indispensable party is one who has such an interest in the
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subject-matter of the controversy that a final decree cannot be made without affecting his interests, or leaving the controversy in such a situation
that its final determination may be inconsistent
with equity and good conscience. Seminole County
and each of the other holders of certificates of sale
or of liens which they claim upon any of the lands
described in the complaint which the plaintiff seeks
to affect by this decree, was an indispensable party
to this or any suit to avoid or injuriously affect
his certificate or claimed lien. And as Justice
Curtis said in Shields v. Barrow, 58 U.S. (17
How.) 130 138, at 141 (15 L. Ed. 158):
'It being clear that the Circuit Court
could make no decree, as between the parties
originally before it, so as to do complete and
final justice between them without affecting
the rights of absent persons,' the original bill
ought to have been dismissed."
In Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Hofstater, 32 Fed. (2)
184 (1929), the Circuit Court of Appeals, 'Second Circuit,
held that the doctrine of the vendee's indispensability
to an action, however, should not be extended so far as to
include a mere prospective purchaser. Judge Chase
stated:
"The trial court was right in denying the motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction. Rabenold
was not a vendee. What is said concerning a vendee in New Mexico v. Lane, 243 U. S. 52-58, 37 S.
Ct. 348, 61 L. Ed. 588, does not apply here. At
most, Rabenold was only a prospective vendee,
who was affected by this suit only in that its decision might influence his decision to buy or not to
buy."
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In 1lliller v. J{lasn.e·r. 1-±0 Pac. 1107 (191-t ), the 'Supreme Court of Ne\Y nlexico had under consideration a
case aln1ost on all fours \Yi th the one at bar.
The appellee had instituted a suit to enjoin appellant
fron1 interfering \Yith his right to the use of a stated
an1ount of 'vater of an irrigation ditch. The appellant
ans\Yered and filed a cross-complaint. A referee was appointed by the court to take testimony. The referee
served a written notice of the time and place of hearing.
Geo. W. Prichard, Esq. of Santa Fe, appellant's attorney
on receiving this notice advised the referee he could not
attend and also stated he would advise his client so she
could make other arrangements. The referee thereupon
sent a notice by registered mail to appellant but this letter
was missent to Roswell by the postal authorities and
was not received by appellant until sometime after the
hearing. She heard nothing from her attorney.
The referee took testimony and the court upon mo_tion
and without notice to appellant considered the referee's
report and rendered judgment thereon awarding appellee
two-thirds of the ditch and a one-third interest to Ellen
Casey, who was not a party to the suit, but who appeared
to be the mother of appellant. From the record it appeared that the appellant was either the~ agent of her
mother, Ellen Casey, or was a tenant in common with her
mother and otheTs to the lands involved.
After the above judgment was rendered, the appellant for various reasons moved to have the same set
aside and vacated. The motion was denied and the cause
appealed.
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The Supreme Court of New Mexico stated:
"Appellant contends that the court should
have vacated the decree, because she had no opportunity to defend her rights. Waiving this question, however, the judgment in question should
have been set aside, because it appears from the
decree itself that Ellen Casey was a necessary and
indispensable party to the action. It is a familiar
and fundamental rule that a· court can make no
decree affecting the rights of a person over whom
it has not obtained jurisdiction, or between the
parties before it, which so far involves or depends
upon the rights of an absent person that complete
and final justice ~annot be done between the parties to the suit without affecting those rights.
Shields et al. v. Barrow, 17 How. 130, 15 L. Ed.
158. In this case appellee's right to the relief which
he sought necessarily depends upon a determination of his right to the use of the ditch and water
as against Ellen Casey, or the principals, represented by appellant. Until this right was determined the court could not rightfully enjoin appellant from using the water, as the representative of
these absent parties. The injunction was necessarily predicated upon the prior determination of
these rights. The interest of Ellen Casey was
necessarily so interwoven with the interests of the
parties to this suit that no decree could possibly
be made, affecting the rights of those before the
court, without operating upon her interest. Such
being the case, she was an indispensable party,
without whom the court could not lawfully proceed. C.S.M. Co. v. V. & G.H.W. Co., 1 Sawyer,
685, F'ed. Cas. No. 2,990. When this fact was developed by the evidence, even though it had not

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

33
been raised by the pleadings, the court should have
taken notice of the same and have directed that the
cause stand oYer, in order that such party could
be brought in. ~>\.s 'Yas said by the Massachusetts
Supreme Court, in the case of Schwoerer v. Boylston ~larket _. A. ssociation, 99 l\Iass. 285 : 'If there
be an omission of an indispensable party, so that
a complete decree cannot be n1ade without him,
the court will itself, ex mero motu, take notice of
the fact, and direct the cause to stand over, in
order that such new party may be added.'
~~2. ''Thile it is true, the general rule is that
a defendant must take advantage of the defect
of parties by demurrer or answer, failing in which
the objection is waived, still this rule does not
apply to an indispensable party, and where the
court may not proceed to a decree or judgment
without his presence. Peck v. Peck, 33 Colo. 421,
80 Pac. 1063; Denison v. Jerome, 43 Colo. 456, 96
Pac. 166.
"3. The only remaining question then is
whether the objection ·that there is the want of a
necessary and indispensable party can be taken
after a judgment by default, by motion to set aside
the judgment. This question was answered in the
affirmative by the Supreme Court of Texas, in the
case of Ebell v. Bursinger, 70 Tex. 120, 8 S. W. 77.
The court said: 'The court should not render a
judgment, there being the want of a necessary
party to a suit. The defendant in such a case has
a right to presume that the court will not enter
an erroneous judgment against him, and hence
should not be held in default until the necessary
party is brought before the court. If judgment by
default be taken, it should be set aside upon motion; and in case the motion be overruled it will be
reversed upon appeal or a writ of error.' See, also,
Monday v. Vance, 11 Tex. Civ. App. 374, 32 S. W.
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599, and Black on Judgments (2d Ed.) Chapt. 325J
where the author says that a judgment taken by
default will be set aside as irregular, when it appears that a real party in interest was not made
a party defendant.
"This being true, the trial court should have
sustained appellant's motion to vacate and set
aside the judgment. For its failure so to do the
judgment must be reversed and the cause remanded, with instructions to sustain the motion .to vacate the judgment, and to proceed no further until
the necessary parties are made parties defendant
by amendment, and that upon appellant's failure
to do this the suit be dismissed, unless by amendment issue can be joined, that the rights of others
will not be affected by the judgment; and it is so
ordered."
In Vincent Oil Co. v. Gulf Refining Co., 195 Fed. 434
(1912), the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
held that an oil company which was assignee of an undivided half interest in an oil lease and was in exclusive possession and operating the property, was an indispensable
party to a suit to establish the validity of a prior lease,
the necessary effect of which would be to invalidate its
own, and also, even if it were not a party, to interfere
with its exclusive possession.
The court stated:
"The decree .sought would interfere. with the
possession of the Producers' Oil Company, which
is now exclusive of the complainant, and would
place the complainant in join possession. It would
set up the Staiti lease and cancel the Hooks lease,
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which is the source of the title held by the Producers' Oil Con1pany. It is true that the decree
would not be binding on the Producers' Oil Company, but surely that company should be before
the court to be heard in a case affecting its possession and the source of its title."
For other similar cases see: Page v. Town of Gallup,
191 Pac. 460 (New Mex.) (1920); Egyptiarn Novaculite
Co. v. Stevenson, 8 Fed. (2) 576 (CCA 8) (1925).
In American ~Iutttal Building & Loan Co. v. Jones,
117 P (2) 293 (1941), the Supreme Court of Utah held in
a quiet title suit that the lower court in joining Utah
County as a party defendant, on its own motion, was
correct and proper where the County had title to the
property by virtue of a valid auditor's deed.
Justice Pratt, speaking for the Court, stated:
"The order of the lower court making Utah
County a party was not an error. The County had
good tax title. Its subsequent failure to make a
valid sale did not affect its title. Plaintiff had no
title. To adjudicate that the title of Robert Jones
is void does not accomplish anything for plaintiff
with valid title standing in the County. The Court
could not adjudicate against the County without
making the County a party."
In Ebell v. Bursinger, 70 Tex. 120, 8 S.W. 77 (1888),
plaintiff brought a suit to cancel a deed conveying to the
defendant certain real property in trust for the defendant's daughter, Anna Ebell, on the ground that the conveyance was procured by threats and intimidation. No
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answer being filed the plaintiff took judgment by default.
Defendant filed a motion to set aside the judgment, which
was overruled. One ground of the motion was that the
beneficiary under the deed had not been made a party
to the suit. In reversing the lower Court's ruling the
Court stated (at page 77):
"Two questions are presented by the assignment: First, was the cestui que trust a necessary
party to the suit~ And second, can the objection
for want of a necessary party be taken by motion
in the Court below after default or upon appeal f'
After holding that the beneficiary was a necessary
party the Court then considered the question whether the
objection could be taken after a judgment by default.
After holding in the affirmative, the Court stated, page
78 (SW):
"The court should not render a judgment,
there being the want of a necessary party to the
suit. The defendant in such a case has a right to
presume that the Court will not enter an erroneous
judgment against him and hence should not be held
in default until the necessary party is brought before the Court. If judgment by default be taken,
it should be set aside upon motion ; and, in case
the motion be overruled, it will be reversed upon
appeal or a writ of error."
·In Monday v. V a.nce, 11 Tex. Civ. App. 374, 32 S.W.
559 (1895), the Court held that the non-joinder of necessary parties defendant could be first made even on appeal.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

37
With respect to the water stock involved in this action "~e quote fro1n Iron City Sav. Bank v. Isaacsen, 164
S. E. 520 (1932) ""here the Supreme Court of Virginia
stated, page 528:
"The only other equitable· relief prayed is an
injunction against the ·southeast Lumber Export
Company, Inc. and its president restraining them
from transferring on the books of the corporation
the 139 shares of the stock of the corporation
standing thereon in the name of Irma Isaacsen,
which had been assigned and transferred to her by
Henri Isaacsen.
"The right of the complainant to such an injunction is predicated entirely upon its right to
have the stock transfer from Henri Isaacsen to
Irma Isaacsen set aside; and the granting of such
an injunction would necessarily affect the rights
and interests of Irma Isaacsen in and to the shares
of stock. Therefore, she was an indispensable
party to this bill both in its aspect of a bill to set·
aside the stock transfer and in its aspect of a bill
for an injunction. This being so, until the court
had acquired jurisdiction of her person, or had
acquired such control over these shares of stock
as to give it jurisdiction to proceed against this
stock as a res upon an order of publication as to
her, it had not acquired actual jurisdiction to grant
a permanent injunction restraining the corporation, or its president, from transferring these
shares of stock on the books of the corporation."
The Court's attention is also invited to Barguette
v. Del Curts, 163 P (2) 257, at page 260, where the Supreme Court of New Mexico stated:
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"That an indispensable party defendant has
been omitted may be raised at any time."
THE PRESENT JUDGMENT CONSTITUTES A CLOUD ON
JAY LARSEN'S TITLE.

Although prior to the filing of the Lis Pendens and
the entry of the default judgment in this case, _Jay Larsen was the fee owner of record of the 160.84 acres of
land, excepting the mineral rights, and the 160 shares of
stock of the Big Six Irrigation Company, both land and
water stock are now vested by Court decree in plaintiffs
in an action to which Jay Larsen as such fee owner of
record was not made a party. He now holds as grantee
from a grantor whose title has been completely divested
by the Court and declared null and void. This assertion
by plaintiffs of adverse interest in his property by formal
judgment entered by the Court below is a cloud on his
title·.
As to what constitutes a cloud of title, we invite
the Court's attention to the annotation "What Constitutes
Cloud on Title Removable in Equity" contained in 78
A.L.R., pages 24 to 313; also Gardner v. Buckeye Savilngs
& Loan CompOIYIIJJ, 108 W. Va. 673, 152 S. E. 530, 78
A. L. R. 1; Homewood Re:alty Corporation v. Safe Deposit & Trust Comp·any, 160 Md. 457, 154 Atl. 58, 78
A. L. R. 8; Briggs v. Industrial Bank, 197 N. C. 120, 147
S. E. 815, 78 A. L. R. 20; Trustees of Schools v. Wilson,
334 Ill. 347, 166 N. E. 55, 78 A. L. R. 22.
In the Buckeye case, p. 5 of A. L. R., the West Virginia Court stated :
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.. What is a cloud~ Black's Law Dictionary
defines it to be an outstanding claim or incuinbrance 'Yhich, if valid, would affect or ilnpair the
title of the owner of a particular estate, and which
apparently on its face has that effect, but which
can be shown by extrinsic proof to be invalid or
inapplicable to the estate in question. In 32 Cyc.
131-!, the general rule is stated: 'A cloud, such as
equity "'"ill undertake to remove, is the semblance
of a title, either legal or equitable, or a claim of
an interest in lands appearing in some legal form,
but which is in fact unfounded, and which it would
be inequitable to enforce.' The attributes generally recognized as necessary to create a cloud are
that the claim must be (1) apparently valid, and
(2) capable of embarrassing title."
The cases establish that a mere verbal claim or oral
assertion of ownership or a mere apprehension on the
part of a property owner that an adverse claim of title
or interest may be asserted against him, does not constitute a cloud on title. On the other hand, assertions in
judicial proceedings have been held to constitute a cloud
on title. See 78 A. L. R. 43.
The Utah case of Schenck v. Wicks, 23 Utah 576,
65 Pac. 732 (1901) is cited on page 27 of the A. L. R.
Annotation. In the Schenck case, this Court stated, page

581:
"A cloud on a title is something, such as a
mortgage, deed, or judgment, etc., which shows
prima facie some interest in a third party in or to
the property adverse to the person vested with
the real title to the same, or to one having an
interest therein."
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Under the authorities, by the judgment of the Court
below it is clear that Jay Larsen's title to his irrgated
pasture and to his water stock has been clouded. His
right to possession has been placed in jeopardy. The
n1erchantability of his title has been seriously damaged.
RIGHT OF JAY LARSEN TO INTERVENE IN ACTION.

Again, there can be no doubt of Jay Larsen's right
to intervene in this action and that the Court below
erred in denying his motion to set aside the judgment
and to intervene as a party defendant.
Even if Larsen had acquired his interest in the property while the action was pending or even after the d~
fault judgment was entered, he would still have standing
to contest the validity of the judgment below. See: 104
A. L. R. 697 and annotation under heading: "N.onparty
who acquires interest in property pending action or
after judgment as within benefit of statute or rule providing for opening, vacating or setting aside of judgments." It is there stated, page 697 :
"While strangers to the record, unless authorized by statute, ordinarily have no standing on
which to base an application to open, vacate, or
set aside a judgment, it is by no means true that
the right to move for the vacation of a judgment
is strictly limited to the parties to the action,
where the interests of a non-party will be affected
by the judgment."
Se.e, also, Rule 25 (e) of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure relating to transfer of interest while an action
is pending.
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In the present case, Jay Larsen acquired his interest
many years prior to the suit, having gone into possession
in 193S under a contract to purchase and receiving his
warranty deed fron1 defendants thereunder in 1942. His
fee interest ""as personally known and known of record
to plaintiffs. His right to intervene under the authorities and under the Utah rules is clear.
In Guenther v. Funk, 274 N. W. 839 (1937), the Su-

preme Court of North Dakota stated the general rule as
follows:
"The general rule is that none but the parties
to a judgment can have it set aside; and that a
stranger to the record, who was neither a party
nor privy to the action, cannot move to vacate the
judgment.
"This general rule, however, is subject to the
exception that persons, not nominal parties to the
action or successsors in interest, but whose rights
are injuriously affected thereby, may, under
proper circumstances, have a judgment vacated.
1 Freeman on Judgments, Sec. 260 et seq.; 34
c. J., p. 345."

Freeman on Judgments, 5th Ed., Sec. 260, states:
"When Third Persons May Apply.-The rule
that none but parties to the judgment are permitted to interfere admits of exceptions, excluding
from its operation persons not nominal parties
to the action, but who are necessarily affected by
the judgment, and who have equities entitled to be
protected from its operation."
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Different types of cases are then listed such as
intervention by a judgment creditor in action against
debtor, beneficiary in action against trustee, landlord in
action against tenant, comptroller in action against city,
indemnitor in action against indemnitee, persons preju.
dicially affected in proceedings against property, etc.
Jay Larsen is in privity with defendants as their
grantee. His interests in both land and water stock have
been prejudicially affected in that plaintiffs, within a
period of 30 days, were able by default judgment to have
such property and the right to possession ve·sted in themselves. As defendants' grantee, Jay Larsen is no stranger
to the record. The title to his property has been vitally
affected.
It is, of course, well established that a third party
will not be allowed to intervene in an action to remove
cloud on title even though, claiming title to the premises,
he does not rely upon any source of title sought to be
established in the action. For example, the North Carolina Supreme Court in Moore v. Massengill, 41 S. E. (2d)
655, 170 A. L. R. 147 (1947) stated:
"The only question presented on this appeal
is simply this: May a third party, who claims
title to the premises involved in an action toremove cloud upon title, but who is not relying upon
any source of title sought to be established in such
action, be permitted to interplead and have her
independent claim of title adjudicated therein~
Our decisions do not so hold."
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This rule has long been the law in Utah and was
first expressed in Moo~re v. Wilson, 1 Utah 187, whe·re it
w·as held in a quiet title suit that there was a misjoinder
of parties defendant where the defendants claimed title
from no common source. The Court stated:
"This is sufficient to dispose of the case, for
the defendants having totally distinct claims, and
having title from no common source, cannot in
such a case as this, be joined in the same proceedings.''
On the other hand, where a third party is in privity
of estate claiming title from a common source with the
defendant he may and should be intervened in the action.
On this question, we invite the Court''S attention to
Annotation in 170 A. L. R., pages 149-156, entitled "Who
May Intervene in Suit to Quiet Title". This annotation
refers to the decision of this Court in West: Point I rrigation Ditch Co. v. Moroni & Mt. P. Irrigation Ditch Co.,
14 Utah 127, 46 P. 762 (1896) as holding that in a suit to
determine the plaintiff's rights to the waters of a river,
the owners of an irrigation ditch deriving its water supply from the river had a right to intervene in the action.
The above annotation refers to the following cases:

Knotts v. Tuxburg (1917), 69 Ind. App. 248, 117
N. E. 282, where it was held to be the duty of the Court
to admit a railway company as a defendant after introduction, as the last item of evidence in the trial of a quiet
title action, of a certfied cop·y of a deed, which described
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lands including those in -controversy, executed in favor
of the· railway company by one of the defendants.
West Point Oil & Gas Co. v. DUIYI!n (1929; Tex. Civ.
App.), 18 S. W. (2d) 267, where the purchaser of a portion of a 200-acre tract was permitted to intervene in an
action brought by the vendor to remove an alleged void
n1ortgage as a cloud upon the title to the entire tract in
order to protect herself on her warranty to the purchaser,
the court saying that the intervenor "was vitally interested in this matter, and if it were necessary in order
to remove such cloud, to cancel any instruments which
affected the title to his land, he was not only a proper,
but a nece'ssary party."
Squarely supporting Jay Larsen's right to intervene
and not distinguishable from the case at bar is the case of
Montgomery v. Beck decided by the Supreme Court of
California in 1928 and reported in 272 Pac. 1058. The
Court there held that the successor in interest to property, whose interest was acquired prior to the commencement of the action, was entitled to intervene in the action
after the entry of default against his predecessor. The
Court stated, pages 1058-9:
"This appeal was submitted upon an order
to show cause, the respondent having presented
and filed no brief herein. This action was one to
quiet title to certain real property. One of the
defendants named therein was the Los Angeles
Realty Syndicate, a defunct corporation, jurisdiction over which was obtained by seTvice of process
upon one of the former directors and then existing
trustees thereof. The trustees were not made
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parties to said action, and they permitted said
defunct corporation to be in default, and the default thereof upon the proof of such service was
entered in the action. Thereafter the appellant,
\Y·. D .....\shbaugh, Inade application for leave to
interYene in the action, alleging himself to be the
owner of the premises in question as the successor
in interest of said defunct corporation; and in his
amended co1nplaint, in support of his application,
he set forth the foundation of his title and ownership of said premises as consisting in a judgment
obtained by him against said Los Angeles Realty
Syndicate prior to the institution of the present
action, decreeing him to be the owner of said
prennse·s.
"(1) The plaintiff's opposition to said application for intervention was twofold, consisting,
first, in the contention that the default of said defunct corporation, having been duly entered before
the making of said application for leave to intervene constituted a sufficient ground for the denial
of the same. There is no merit in this contention.
An intervener claiming title to property adverse
to both the plaintiff and the defendant named in
an action to quiet title cannot be prevented, as to
his right, to intervene therein by the fact that one
or all of the named defendants may have suffered
a default. Morgan v. Bonynge, 157 Cal. 295, 107
P. 312; Townsend v. Driver, 5 Cal. App. 581, 90
P. 1071.
"(2) The second ground of opposition to the
appellant's asserted right to intervene was based
upon certain affidavits filed in opposition thereto,
based upon the rather insufficient averments of
the applicant's original cross-complaint in intervention. Upon the presentation thereof, however,
the trial court-granted the said applicant leave to
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present an amended complaint which definitely set
forth, as the basis of his right to intervene, the
judgment obtained by him against the Los Angeles
Realty Syndicate prior to the institution of the
present action, decre-eing him, as against said defunct corporation, to be the owner of the premises
in question. No objection having been presented
by the plaintiff as to the form or sufficiency of
said amended complaint in intervention, it is
apparent that it sufficiently stated such an adverse interest in, and ownership of, the premises
as should have entitled the applicant to an order
permitting him to intervene in this action, and the
denial by the trial court of his right so to do must
be held to be such an abuse of discretion as will
compel a reversal of its order made herein in so
far as the same purported to deny to the appellant
leave to file hils answer and cross-complaint in
intervention. It is not necessary to consider that
portion of said order which consisted in a denial
of the application for an order setting aside the
default of the Los Angeles Realty Syndicate,
since, irrespective of the entry of such default, the
applicant had, as we have been, a right a's an
adverse claimant of said premises to appear and
intervene herein.
"The order is reversed."
To the same effect is Crofton v. Y owng, 119 P. (2d)
1003 (1941) (Calif.), where the intervener's predecessor
was named by plaintiff as sole defendant. Against the
argument that a litigant has the right in a quiet title
suit to select hils own defendants, the Court stated, page
1006:
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"'It clearly appears from the record before
us that the entire interest of the original defenddant, the bank, had been assigned to Neal and that
he 'Yas the real party in interest and should have
been n1ade the defendant. \Vithout hi's presence
the issues in the quiet title action could not properly have been determined."
'See, also: Johnston v ..Lll edina Improvement Club,
Inc., 116 P. {2d) 272 (\Vash.) (1941); Salina Canyon Coat
Co. v. Klemrn, et al, 76 Utah 372 (1930).
Under the foregoing cases and under the specific
provisions of Rule 22 relating to Interpleader, and Rule
2±, relating to Intervention, of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, Jay Larsen's right to intervene in the action
cannot be questioned.
DENIAL OF JAY LARSEN'S MOTION TO INTERVENE ON
THE GROUND OF PLAINTIFFS' OFFER OF A QUIT CLAIM
DEED TO THE SURFACE RIGHTS WAS ERROR.

The minute entry (R. 56) of the hearing on June 11,
1952, at Provo, states in part:
"During argument Mr. Pugsley tendered in
open Court a quit claim deed of all right, title and
interest in and to the surface of real estate· and
water stock referred to in the judgment subject to
the reserving a right to all mineral, oil and gas interest in the property to Jay Lar'sen."
The Court's ruling denying Jay Larsen's motion to
intervene (R. 55) states in part:
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"In view of the plaintiff's offer made in open
Court to tender Jay Larsen a quit claim deed to
the surface rights of the land involved, the motion
of Jay Larsen to set aside the judgment by default
and to intervene in the suit is denied."
Proceeding into the discussion of this aspect of the
case, we again invite the Court's attention to the fact
that plaintiffs in this action did not bring a suit to quiet
title to mineral rights. They brought a suit to set aside
and cancel a deed to 160.84 acres of land in fee and 160
shares of stock in the Big Six Irrigation Company. They
did not sever the mineral rights in their complaint; nor
were the mineral rights severed in the default judgment.
They asked for and were adjudged the owners and entitled to the possession of the whole works,-lock, stock
and barrel. Being faced with the long list of authorities
establishing the necessary and indispensable status of
Jay Larsen as a party to the suit, and being unable to
amend their default judgment to have it give a different
kind of relief. than that prayed for in their complaint,
plaintiffs attempted to work their way out of their dilemma by the clever maneuver of tendering him a quit claim
deed to the surface rights and water stock in open Court.
The maneuver was successful. Without letting Jay Larsen be a party to the suit, the Court thus indirectly permitted plaintiffs to amend their judgment.
F'rom a practical standpoint, from Jay Larsen's point
of view, the quit claim deed by itslf would be worth
little. It is doubtful that such a deed dated now or any
other time would clear his title. He doesn't know whether
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plaintiff's father or mother left a will; he doesn't know
whether their estates are being probated; he doesn't
kno'v 'Yhether the plaintiffs constitute all of the heirs of
Joseph F. ''Tarr and Elizabeth Warr; he doesn't know if
any judgment creditors might have right~s against the
property; he doesn't know whether plaintiffs, after giving
the quit claim deed would then turn around and institute
suit against him to have it set aside and cancelled just as,
in this action, they sought to and did have their father's
and n1other's warranty deed set aside. Then, too, hE:'
would be in the dark with respect to the question of value
of use and occupancy of the premises for the years of
possession prior to the date of the deed. In short, he
doesn't want the deed, won't accept the deed, and, not
having been made a party to the action, shouldn't be
forced to accept the deed.
From the legal standpoint the question then is,~Iust Jay Larsen be forced to institute an independent
action against plaintiffs (at the expense of defendants
under their warranty deed) to clear his title, or will his
clearly established right to intervene in this action be
recognized~

We suggest that Jay Larsen be allowed to intervene
because the Court below erred in denying his petition.
In denying Jay Larsen's motion on the sole ground of
plaintiffs' offer of a quit claim to the surface rights and
water stock, the Court below recognized that Jay Larsen
had some interest in the property. The plaintiffs them..
selves in making the offer publicly and of record reeognized that their 30-day default judgment was erroneous
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and illegal with re'spect to the surface rights and water
stock held by the defendants' grante·e.
We quote from Rule 54 (c) (2) of the Utah Rules:
"(2) Judgment by default. A judgment by
default shall not be different in kind from or
exceed in amount, that specifically prayed for in
the demand for judgment." (Italics supplied.)
The note under the above rule states:

"* * * also, the word ''specifically' was inserted
on line 8 to make sure that a general prayer for
relief would not be· sufficient to grant relief different than that 'specifically' requested * * *"
The above rule is to be compared with the old rule in
the Code of Civil Procedure, Sec. 104-30-5, which only
stated that the relief "cannot exceed" that demanded in
the complaint.
Plaintiffs, having gotten by default judgment "specifically" what they requested, could not thereafter modify
their judgment to sever the mineral interests from the
property covered by the judgment. To modify the judgment, the Court would first have to set it aside and
the case would then be on the merits which is exactly
where, in this case, plain tiffs don't want the case to be.
The attention of the Court is invited to the provisions of the Judicial c·ode, Sections 104-40-12 and 13,
concerning the service of process and the rendition of
judgments in quiet title suits. These sections seem to
imply that all persons with known interests should be
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joined and unknn\vn persons, as "~en, 'vho elailu soute
interest in the property.
.-..\.s Jay Larsen 'Yas in possession and clainting adversely to plain tiffs, Rule 9 (a) (3) would seem to infer
that if the plaintiffs did not kno,y· his na1ne he should at
least have been listed as .. lTnknown".
l~nder r:tah practice, the authorized procedure which
should have been followed by the Court below was to have
granted Jay Larsen's petition to inte-rvene. Plaintiffs
could then have disclaimed as to him and the case tried
on the merits between plaintiffs and defendants with respect to the oil rights only. Section 104-40-3 of the
Judicial Code relates to disclaimer. Or the plaintiffs
could have amended their complaint to restrict it to a
suit over the mineral rights. Either way, Jay Larsen
would have been eliminated and his rights protected.
A case closely resembling the case at bar is Townsend
v. Driver, (1907) 5 Cal. App. 581, 90 P. 1071. This ca·se
was an appeal from the judgment quieting title. and from
an order denying a motion to vacate such judgment.
Plaintiff had filed his complaint but did not joint appellants as parties to the action. The Court granted appellants leave to intervene and each complaint in intervention alleged that the interveners were the owners of specified portions of the land described in the complaint.
Thereupon the plaintiff's attorneys filed in the
Clerk's office a written direction to the Clerk to enter a
dismissal of the action as to the intervening defendants.
Afterwards, and without notice to the interveners, the
Court ordered the default of the defendants who had not
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been included in the dismissal order and gave judgment
against such defendants. The Court likewise decreed
that plaintiff was the owner and in possession of the
premises described and quieted plaintiff's title therein.
In such judgment it was recited that plaintiff, by his
attorneys, had dismissed as to certain defendants which
were named, but neither in the order to the' Clerk nor
in the judgment were the interveners designated as such,
nor did it appear that any order was made .by the Court
vacating its order granting leave to intervene unless the
recital in the judgment had such effect.
Thereafter, interveners moved the Court to set aside
its judgment because they had been given no notice of
the trial of the action. This motion was denied and from
the order refusing to vacate the judgment appellants filed
their appeal. The Court stated, page 1072 :
"The action to quiet title is one for the recovery of real property. South Tule, etc. Ditch
Co. v. King, 144 Cal. 455, 77 Pac. 1032. The real
property so sought to be recovered is, therefore,
the subject-matter of such action. The order of
the superior court granting leave to intervene determined that interveners had an interest in the
matter in litigation, and under section 387, Code
of Civil Procedure, were entitled as parties to
avail themselves of all of the procedure and remedie:s to which the defendants were entitled for the
purpose of defeating the action or resisting plaintiff's claim. People v. Perris Irr. District, 132
Cal. 290, 64 Pac. 399, 773. It appears from the
bill of exceptions that interveners served and filed
their complaints, setting forth the grounds upon
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'Yhich their intervention rested, due service of
'vhich is certified in the bill, 'vhich 1nust be accepted as service upon all parties to the action, as
required by Section 887, l'iode of Civil Procedure,
and the clailu to the subject Inatter is an interest
adYerse to both plaintiff and defendants. The
only relief sought, however, by these co1nplaints
in intervention, was that plaintiff take nothing
andthatinterveners recover costs. Under the law,
their position was thereafter that of "plaintiff in
intervention, uniting "~i th the defendant in the
cause in resisting the demands of plaintiff in the
cause." St. Charles R. R. Co. v. Fidelity, etc. Co.,
33 South 574, 109 La. 491. The inaction of the
defendants in permitting their default does not
preclude intervener fro1n his relief."
The plaintiffs and the Court below have recognized
Jay Larsen's interest. He should have been allowed to..
intervene. The Townsend case quoted above holds that
after such intervention, the plaintiff, without disclaiming
or modifying his complaint with respect to the interveners, could not proceed to dismiss the action as to them
only and take default against the non-intervening defendants. The above opinion of the California Court
seems in harmony with Rule 41 of the Utah Rules relating
to the dismissal of an action, and it is apparent that under
this rule, after Jay Larsen is allowed to intervene, plaintiffs would not be allowed to dismiss the action as against
him except on such conditions as the Court deems proper
which would require, of course, the rendition of such a
judgment as would not p·ut a cloud on Jay Larsen's title
to the property.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

54
From the foregoing authorities it is clear that the
plaintiffs' offer of a quit claim dee·d to the surface rights
and water stock was not a proper ground on which to
deny the clear right of Jay Larsen to intervene in the
suit to protect his interest in the property.
UPON BEING APPRISED THAT A NECESSARY AND INDISPENSABLE PARTY TO THE SUIT HAD NOT BEEN
JOINED THE COURT BELOW SHOULD HAVE DISMISSED
THE ACTION.

Reference has been made heretofore to the provisions
of Rule 21 relating to the misjoinder and non-joinder of
parties. Under this rule, of course, misjoinder of parties
is not ground for dismissal of an action. However, the
non-joinder of an indispensable party doers render the
action subject to dismissal.
Rule 12 (b) set forth the defenses and objections
which shall be asserted by a pleading or by a motion.
Reference is made under subdivilsion (1) to lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction
over the person, ( 3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of
process, ( 5) insufficiency of service of process, ( 6) failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted, and of
significance here, (7) "failure to join an indispen~sable

party".·
Under Rule 12 (h) it is provided that all defenses.
and objections are waived unless made by a motion or
if no motion ha.s been made, in the answer or reply, except that the defense of "failure to join an indispensable
party" may be made by a later pleading if one is permitted or by motion for judgment on the pleadings or;
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at the trial on the Inerits. It is thus seen that the failure
to join an indispensable party is a special n1atter and
fatal to the Inaintenance of a suit.
The objection of Jay Larsen's necessary and indispensable status 'vas timely raised by defendants in their
first motion filed 'vith the Court on Nov. 20, 1951 and
was 'vithin the allo,.vable period prescribed by Rule 60 (b)
which governs n1otions made to the Court to obtain relief
from a final judgment. R.ule 60 (b) prescribes a three
months' limitation on reasons 1, 2, 3 and 4 of said Rule,
which do not include the objection of non-joinder of an
indispensable party. It is therefore probable that a
longer time limit would be allowed in advancing this
ground which would perhaps be included under No. 7,
the catch all provision of Rule 60 (b). This point, however, is academic here for the reason mentioned above,
namely, that the motion to set aside the judgment rendered by the Court below both for the reason of lack of
an indispensable party and entry of the judgment due
to the defendants' mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect was filed within the period of three months
from the date of the entry of default and also the default
judgment.
Defendants' motion of November 20, 1951 was based,
among other things, on the affidavit of meTits and the
proposed answer of defendants filed with the motion
which answer sets up as a complete defense to the action
(R. 22) the non-joindeT of Jay Larsen as a necessary and
indispensable party to the action. The objection having
been timely made and properly made, the Court should
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then have. dismissed the action or in lieu thereof required
by order the plaintiffs to join Jay Larsen as a party to
the action, and Carter Oil Company, as well, if complete
relief is to be accorded between the interested parties.
Jay Larsen's status was again brought to the Court's
attention by the supplementary motion of defendants
to have the Court reconsider its ruling. It was again
advanced by defendants' further supplemental motion
made solely on the ground of La~sen's indispensability
(and Carter Oil Company as well),. and finally it was
advanced by Jay Larsen's own m9tion to have the judgment set aside and to intervene in the action.
SETTING ASIDE JUDGMENT AT INTERVENTION OF JAY
LARSEN WILL SET IT ASIDE AS TO DEFENDANTS~ .

We come next to the important questi?n whether if.
Jay Larsen is ·allowed to intervene and the.judgment set··
aside a:s to him, the judgment must likewise.be set aside
as to the defendants.
.

·.

.

We have heretofore discussed the authorities which
establish the right of a third party to intervene in a
quiet title suit as a party defendant where his title is -·. -·
derived from a common source with .that sought to he
e~stablished in the ·action. F·or example, in 118 A. L. R.
1401-2, in annotatton entitled "Joinder of claims to separate parcels in suit to quiet or to remove cloud on title
or to determ~ne various claims to land", reference is
made to the case of White Point Oil and Gas Co. v. Dunn,
(1929 Tex. Civ. App.) 18 S.W. (2d) 267. This case held
in an action to cancel an alleged void n1ortgage covering
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an entire tract of land that an intervener who has purchased 'Yith a warranty of title a part of the tract is a
necessary party to the suit. See Buchanan Coal Co. ,,,_
S,mith, (1914) 115 \T a. 704, 80 S. E. 794.
Free1nan on Judgments, 5th Ed., Sec. 101, states:
~·In

case of a default by one or more of several defendants as to 'vhom but one judgment is
proper, judgment against the parties in default
should not be entered until the ca·se is finally disposed of as to the others."
Again, in 'Sec. 259, the Rule is expressed:
~'If

a judgment prejudicially affects two or
more persons, either of them may move for its
vacation and, if proper cause is shown, may obtain
relief."
The matter is more fully covered by an annotation
in 78 A. L. R. 938 under the heading "Successful Defense
by One Co-defendant, or a Finding for 'Defendants' as
inuring to the benefit of defaulting defendant". At page
939 the general rule is stated as follows :
"The question whether a successful defense
by some of several codefendants may inure to the
benefit of a defaulting defendant is dependent
upon the nature, scope, and extent of the defense
interposed by the answering defendants, and, to
some extent, upon the joint or several nature of
the right asserted.
"The courts are agreed with practical unanimity that in actions against several defendants
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jointly, where the defense interposed by the answering defendant is not personal to himself, (as
is the defense of infancy, coverture or bankruptcy
on the part of the pleader), but common to all, as
where it goes to the whole right of the plaintiff
to recover at all, as distinguished from his right
to recover as against any particular defendant,
or questions the merits or validity of the plaintiff's entire cause of action in general, or his right
to sue, such defense, if successful, inures to the
benefit of the defaulting defendants both in actions
at law and suits in equity, with the result that
final judgment must be entered not merely in
favor of the answering defendant, but also in
favor of the defaulting defendants."
See also, cases cited under VII of Annotation, p.
945 A. L. R. Vol. 78, entitled "Applications of rule' where
defense negatives right of plaintiff to sue or to recover
at all." Reference is made to the case of Minium v. Solel,
(1916) (Mo.) 183 S. W. 10-37, which involved a suit
against a City and another defen~ant to quiet title to
land. The City defaulted and the other defendant defended on the ground (1) that the strip of land in controversy was a public alley of the defendant city, and (2)
that the defendant himself had title to the land. The
Court held that a judgment by default could not be entered against the City because the claim of the other
defendant was founded upon the City's title so that a
successful defense by ·such defendant necessarily demontrated that the plaintiff had no cause of action against
the City.
.t
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It is, of course, clear in the case at bar that Jay
Larsen's title is founded upon the defendants' title. A
successful defense by Jay Larsen to the action would
necessarily den1onstrate there 'vas no cause of action
against the defendants. .A.t page 950 of 78 A. L. R. the
applicable la'v is stated as follows:
'~\\". here,

in suits in equity against several
defendants jointly interested in the outcome of
the controversy, the plaintiff fails to make a case
or to prove his cause of action as against the
denial of his right to relief by one of the defendants, he cannot have a final decree as against ~he
defendant against whom a decree pro confesso is
entered by default, since the plaintiff in such case
must recover on the strength of his own case, and
by his failure to make out a case he disproves the
equity of his entire cause.
"Thus, in a suit in equity to quiet title to land,
against several defendants, privies in title, some
of whom answered denying the right of the plaintiff to relief, and others defaulted, it was held that
unless the complainant proved his claim as against
the answering defendants, he could not have a
decree as against the defaulting defendants. The
Court said: 'But it must be remembered that complainant makes his claim against such defendants
upon the same title or right that he does against
those that did appear, and none other. The right
he was bound to establish so as to satisfy the
chancellor that he should have relief, though there
had been no appearance by any of the defendants.
And though neither of the defendants had answered, if the proof made shows a want of equity
in complainant's case, he must fail in his action .
. . . . And he should have no greater relief against
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those in default .than against those who have in
fact answered. (Citing cases)
The Court's attention is also invited to the annotation in 155 A. L. R. p. 66 entitled "Opening mortgage
foreclosure decree to bring in omitted parties". This
annotation shows that the Courts have been liberal in reopening judgments of foreclosure upon the ground that
various parties having an interest in the property had
not originally been joined in the action.
POSITION OF CARTER OIL COMPANY:

As heretofore indicated, the plaintiffs, by ratifying
defendants' oil and gas lease with Carter Oil Company,
have put the latter in a neutral position to date. This
so-called law-suit ratification by Carter, however, does
not make Carter a stranger to this case. Although presumably paying rentals to both plaintiffs and defendants
at present, when oil comes, a double royalty will not be
paid. The one royalty will merely be impounded pending
the outcome of this litigation. The suit with respect to
the mineral rights is in substance· a suit by two interested
claimants against the potential fund of royalties. It is
generally held in the "Fund" cases that the holder of the
fund must be joined in the action in order that effective
relief can be accomplished by the Court between the
various parties to the action. Examples of this are suits
against an insurance company by two or more persons
claiming the proceeds of insurance policies and suits
between the beneficiaries of a trust fund. S.ee· 65 Harvard Law Review 1050-9.
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It 'vould appear, therefore, that the Court, on its own
1notion, or the motion of others, should join Carter Oil
Con1pany along with Jay Larsen, in order that complete
and effective relief n1ay be granted by the. Court in this
case.
PLAINTIFFS, ALTHOUGH ASKING FOR EQUITY, HAVE
NOT DONE EQUITY.

As heretofore pointed out, plaintiffs in filing their
action to have their father and mother's warranty deed
set aside, and cancelled, as an outlawed and void mortgage, made no offer to pay any portion of the mortgage
debt or interest thereon, nor any part of the -taxes and
wate-r assessments which have been paid on the property
by defendants and Jay Larsen for a period of over 30
years. They made no offer to pay for any of the improvements on the land.
In some states there is a grave doubt in the first
place whethe·r a mortgage can be removed at all as a
cloud on title by the courts in an action by the mortgagor
or his successors. For example, in Coombs vs. Coombs,
249 Ky. 155, 60 S.W. (2d) 368, 89 A.L.R. 1098, the court
stated:
"A cloud, such as requires the intervention of
a Court to remove, would seem to be one that the
applicant for its removal had neither created nor
was under any personal obligation to discharge,
·or remove; and for which reasons we repeat that .
it is even doubtful if the Arkansas Court had jurisdiction to relieve the land in that State from the
lien that defendant had put upon it."
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On the other hand the general rule appears to be as
follows, taken from 164 A. L. R. 1393, in annotation
entitled "Statute of Limitations or Presumption of Payment from Lapse of Time as Ground for Affirmative
Relief from Debt or Lien" :
"In the application of the general rule that
the statute of limitations may not be asserted as
a ground for affirmative relief, in conjunction with
the equitable maxim that 'he who seeks equity
must do equity', the majority of courts, in the
absence of a statute, declaring a different rule,
hold that a court of equity will not, at the suit of
a mortgagor or his successor in interest, cancel
a real estate- mortgage or other security given for
a debt, for the purpose of removing a cloud of
quieting title, where the only ground urged for
such relief is that the statute of limitations has
run against the right to enforce the encumbrance,
while the debt secured remains unpaid; in such
case equity will require the plaintiff to do equity
or offer to do equity by paying or offering to pay
the lien."
See also p. 1396 where the abo:ve rule is held applicable to the heirs of a mortgagor. Furthermore, the long
delay of over 30 years in asserting any adverse interest
in the property and until after their father and mother
were dead and not until the discovery of oil adjacent to
the property, shows that the plaintiffs have an unmeritorious action, long since barred by laches.
See Sanders v. Flenniken, 21 S.W. (2d) 847,
180 Ark. 303.
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THE ASSESSMENT OF COSTS AGAINST DEFENDANTS
WAS ERROR.

Paragraph 5 of the default judgment (R. 6) awarding plaintiffs their costs of Court was contrary to the
provisions of Section 104-40-3 of the Judicial Code.
THE COURT l\I.AY IMPOSE REASONABLE CONDITIONS
TO THE VACATING OF A DEFAULT JUDGMENT.

Defendants in the Court below stated that they would
be glad upon the setting aside of the default judgment
to accept such terms as the Court saw fit to impose, including costs, disbursements, fees, etc., of plaintiffs. See
21 _A_. L. R. (2d) 863.
JUDGMENT BELOW UNLESS SET ASIDE WILL BE A PROJJFIC SOURCE OF LITIGATION.

Unless Jay Larsen and Carter Oil Company are
joined in this action as necessary and indispensable
parties, the judgment below will only provoke more lawsuits. The tests of indispensability are grounded not
only on conceptions of fair play which permit all interested parties to have their day in Court. The·y are
grounded on practical considerations as well. These considerations have been said to be (1) Effect on absent
person, (2) Danger of inconsistent decision, (3) Multiplicity of suits, and (4) the Rendition of hollow judgments. Each of these has application here.
1

Jay Larsen's interests, and those of Carter Oil Company as well, have been vitally affected by the judgment
below. Larsen's title has been clouded and damaged.
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Carter is presu1nably payi:J;lg two sets of rentals and
knows not from whom it hoJds.
If Jay Larsen is forced to bring an independent
action, the decision in that case will be contrary to and
inconsistent with the judgment rendered in this case. The
issue of his case is the issue of this case. His defense
is the defendants' defense. Contrary judgments would
have been rendered by the same Court on. the same identical issue.
Multiplicity of suits in the present circumstances, is
not merely probable but certain. The judgment below
rings hollow and settles nothing. The warranties of title
to Carter and Jay Larsen are involved. The validity of
defendants' oil and gas lease as affected by the judgment
below would certainly be tested in further litigation. The
Colorado Bank's duties to its trust beneficiaries would
require a real and genuine effort to secure. a test of the
validity of the lease not on the basis· of the present judgment but on the merits.
In view of the foregoing, defendants, respectfully
suggest that the default judgment below be set aside on
the ground that necessary and indispensable parties were
not joined as parties defendant and given an opportunity
to be heard in the action.
POINT II.
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
THE DEFENDANTS HAVE FAILED TO SHOW THAT
THEIR FAILURE TO ANSWER WAS DUE TO MISTAKE,
INADVERTENCE, SURPRISE OR EXCUSABLE NEGLECT
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AND IN DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO SET ASIDE
AND VACATE THE DEFAULT AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT.

The Court belo'v (R. 31) denied defendants' 1notion
to set aside the judgment and ruled that the innocent
and honest mistake of D.on Barr, defendants' process
agent in Utah, "\Yas inexcusable. Defendants' supplemental motion to have the Court reconsider its ruling
was also denied (R. 55). This was, we respectfully submit, error. The error lies in the refusal of the District
Court to give any practical consequence to the policy
now embedded in the new Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
that the Rules ''shall be liberally construed to secure the.
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action." Rule 1 (a).
Rule 55 (c) provides :
" (c) Setting aside default. For good cause
shown the court may set aside an entry of default
and, if a judgment by default has been entered,
may likewise set it aside in accordance with Rule
60 (b)."
Rule 60 (b) provides in part :
"(b) J\IIistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable
Neglect; Newly Discovered Evidence ; Fraud, etc.
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the
court may in the furtherance of justice, relieve
a party or his legal representative from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following
reasons : ( 1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect; * * *
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"The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not
more than three months after the judgment, order
or proceeding was entered or taken * * *."
The Summons in this action was served on July 31,
1951. The default was ente-red August 21, 1951, ana the
default judgment entered on August 31, 1951. Three
months from the entry of default thus expired on November 21, 1951. Defendants' motion was filed on Novembe·r
20, 1951, the day before the deadline.
Defendants first heard "that some kind of a suit
had been filed" against them on N o:vember 7, 1951,
through a telephone call to Ross Bray, an officer of both
defendants, from John Cook, of the Carter Oil Company
(R. 11). That afternoon Bray dispatched a letter to the
Clerk of the District Court in Vernal asking for the
name of plaintiffs' attorney to write to "as no summons
or notice of any kind has ever been served upon either
Company." Cook called back on hour or so later the same
day advising the suit had been filed by the W arr family
and giving the name of the W arr attorneys, Pugsley,
Hayes & Rampton. Bray, that afternoon, then called
Don Barr, Cashier of the Bank of Vernal, in Vernal who
said he recalled no papers having ever been served on
him and that he would investigate. Bray also called
Mr. Baer that afternoon at the Colorado National Bank,
which bank as testamentary trustee has the controlling
interest in the Van Kleeck companies. Baer, an officer
of both companies, is Assistant Trust Officer of the Bank.
Bray also tried to .reach Malcolm Lindsay, President
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of the Van I\Jeeek l\Iortgage (~ontpany, but did not reach
him till the follo,ving n1orning. Bray, after ronsulting
'Yith LindsaY,
. called Baer nt the bank and asked him
to order through Don Barr at \T ernal certified copies of
the complaint, snn1mons, sheriff's return and decree.
'

That same morning, N oven1ber 8, 1951, Baer called
Don Barr at \T ernal "Tho informed him he "had not heard
of any such suit eyer having been filed against the companies." (R. 13). Baer asked Don Barr to secure the
court papers in the action right away and send them
to Denver air mail special delivery. The papers did not
arrive on Frida-y, November 9th. Baer came into the
bank on Saturday morning, November lOth, a day on
'Yhich the bank is normally closed, to see if the papers
had arrived. Photostatic- copies of the papers had arrived
Saturday morning, except for the complaint. That morning Baer conferred with Bray, the bank's attorneys,
Blood, Silverstein and Torgan, and again called Don
Barr long distance on the telephone for the complaint.
Baer went to the bank on Monday, the Armistice Day
holiday, but the complaint had not arrived. The complaint arrived on the morning of Tuesday, November
13th. In the meantime, Mr. Lindsay, President of the
Mortgage Company, died on November 11th, 1951.
On the morning of Tuesday, November 13th, Baer
consulted with Bray, the bank's attorneys, Blood, 'Silverstein and Torgan, and with Mr. Merritt H. Perkins, head
of the Trust Department of the Colorado National Bank
about the immediate retention of Utah counsel. Around
the middle of the day, November 13th, Mr. Perkins called
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C. M. Gihnour at Salt Lake City, Utah, and employed
Messrs. Dey, Hoppa ugh, Mark & Johnson to a.ct as counsel in the matter for the Van Kleeck companies. Conferences in Denve-r were immediately called, Baer's affidavit
being executed in Denver on Friday, November 16th, and
Bray's affidavit on Saturday, November 17th. Don Barr
came up to Salt Lake City and executed his affidavit on
Monday, November 19th. Defendants' motion, affidavit of
1nerits, proposed answer, and other papers attached to
the motion, were filed with the Court in Vernal on Tuesday, November 20th, 1951.
These facts are set forth somewhat extensively to
show with what diligence defendants moved in taking
immediate steps to have the default judgment entered
in this case set aside.
The facts as they developed with relation to the
service of Summons in this action on Don Barr, defendants' process agent in Utah, are perfectly clear.
Approximately four and one half months only after
his appointment as defendants' process agent, namely,
on July 31, 1951, sometime during the working day,
Sheriff H. M. Snyder of Uintah County walked into the
Bank of Vernal to serve the papers in this action on Don
Barr. Barr, at the time, was behind the second teller's
window on the left as you go in the main entrance of the
bank. The Sheriff walked up to the window and said
he had some papers for him. Barr asked what they were.
The Sheriff gave him the papers, writing the service· on
them at the time. Barr then said to the Sheriff: "These
papers are not for me" and handed them back. Barr
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then stated: ~'There must be son1e mistake, these papers
are for \ ..aughn v'7 arr, not Don Barr." The Sheriff then
pushed the papers baek under the grill and said he was
leaving then1 'Yith him nevertheless.
The Sheriff, in his affidavit (R. 45) stated:

HI have a clear recollection of the incident
and there is no doubt in my mind whatsoever,
that Don Barr made an honest mistake in misapprehending the i1nport of the papers being
served upon him because of the close similarity
between the nan1e ';---aughn W arr and his own
name, Don Barr.~,
~Ir.

N.J. ~Ieagher, President of the Bank of Vernal,
was in the bank the day the Sheriff came in. After the
Sheriff left, ~Ieagher walked over to Barr and said :
"Don, what were those papers the 'Sheriff brought in~"
Barr replied: "There was some mistake. The papers did
not pertain to me or the bank. They were for a man by
the name of Warr" (R. 47).
Don Barr has filed three affidavits (R. 26, 46 and 53).
They show that:
(a) He accepted the appointment as defendants' process agent in Utah in March, 1951.
(b) He received no specific instructions concerning his duties, nor did he expect any, because
he knew and realized that his sole and single duty
was merely to forward any papers pertaining to
the Van Kleeck companies to their offices in Denver, Colorado, and that he had no other or further
authority to act for the companies.
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(c) He noticed the name Vaughn W arr on
the papers exhibited to him by the Sheriff but
did not see or have his attention called to the
names of the Van Kleeck companies on such
papers.
(d) Because of the similarity between his
own name, Don Barr, and that of plaintiff, Vaughn
Warr, he made the mistake of thinking that the
papers were intended for Vaughn Warr.
(e) He stated to the Sheriff that there must
be so1ne mistake.
(f) The Sheriff did not explain why he was
serving him or attempt to correct his mistaken
impression concerning for whom the papers were
intended.
(g) He never saw the papers again and no
one knows what happened to them.
(h) If he had se·en, but for his mistake, the
names of the Van Kleeck companies on the papers,
it would have immediately recalled to mind his
appointment, a short time before, as their process
agent in Utah and he would immediately have forwarded the papers to the companies in Denver,
Colorado.
There seemed to be a slight conflict in Barr's first
two affidavits in that in the second one (R. 53), which
plaintiffs' secured from him the morning of the hearing
in Vernal, he stated that when served with process "he
had forgotten about the fact" that he had been appointed.
In his first affidavit (R. 26) however, he had said that if
he had seen or had his attention called to the VanKleeck
names he would have forwarded the papers to the companies in Denver (R. 27, para. 5). To clea.r up this apparent conflict, in his third affidavit (R. 46) Barr stated that
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if his attention had been called to the , . . an l(Jeeck na1nes
it would haYe inunediately recalled to 1nind the fact of
his appointn1ent. In other "Tords, "·hat he n1eant by
"forgotten" "~as that on the day in question his appointment as process agent \Yas not in mind but that it would
have been called to Inind if he had seen or had his attention called to the \""an Kleeck nan1es. The \:""an Kleeck
name is itself unusual. Barr had just been appointed
agent a fe".,. months before and the possibility that his
appointment was buried in his memory beyond recall is
of course absurd. The plaintiffs have made no effort to
controvert Barr's last affidavit.
Cases from numerous jurisdictions, including Utah,
have been especially lenient in setting aside judgments
where the agent or attorney was the only one at fault.
Where the principal was also shown to be at fault a
somewhat stricter attitude is observed in the cases. With
this in view, plaintiffs in the Court below laid great
stress on the claimed dereliction and negligence of the
defendant companies and the Colorado National Bank
in not giving Don Barr detailed instructions concerning
his duties. The short and complete answer, of course, to
this argument is that there were not any duties attached
to the appointment except one, and that was merely to
forward any Van Kleeck papers served upon him to
Denver, Colorado. In accepting the appointment, Barr
knew and realized that this was his only and exclusive
duty. How then can the defendants be charged with
some fault or negligence in not putting into writing,
after Barr's written acceptance of his appointment, the
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one and only duty which Barr, as agent, already knew
and realized was his only duty.
We point out also the care with which Barr himself,
as Cashier of the Bank of Vernal, was _initially selected
and appointed after discussions with officers of the
Colorado National Bank and at the suggestion of the
Colorado bank. When the cashier of a bank is selected,
one would ordinarily be thought to be selecting just
about as reliable and dependable a type of person as it
is possible to select under any circumstances.
We come then to the pertinent question whether Don
Barr's honest mistake was so inexcusable that the Court
below was correct in refusing to set aside the default
judgment entered against his principals, the defendants
and appellants herein.
In Brown v. Beck, 169 P. (2d) 855, the Supreme
Court of Arizona stated:
"A mistake exists when a person, under some
erroneous conviction of law or fact, does, or
omits to do, some act which, but for the. erroneous
conviction, he would not have done or omitted.
Jeremy, Eq. Jur. 358. It may arise either from
unconsciousness, ignorance, forgetfulness, imposition or misplaced confidence. Bisph. Eq. Par.185."
Barr's mistake was in erroneously apprehending
that the papers brought into the Bank at Vernal by the
Sheriff were not intended for him. He made this mistake,
not dishonestly or fraudulently, but for the simple reason
that he thought the papers were for Vaughn Warr, not
Don Barr. The mistake wa.s caused by the close similarity
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of the t\YO na1nes. It w·as an innocent mistake, an honest
n1istake, and one that had a plausible. and legitimate
reason behind it. It is this reason, \Ve think, which n1akes
the n1istake excusable.
Plaintiffs argue, and the Court below felt, that
Barr's reason \Yas no excuse, that his mistake was absolutely and utterly inexcusable. However, we point out
to the Court that on this basis the liberal policy of Rule
60 (b) would have little if any reasonable scop·e of practical application. Courts have repeatedly set aside judgments, for example, where the papers on being mailed
by the process agent are lost or misdirected in the mails,
or where, by reason of a mix-up in a lawyer's office, a
lawyer does not appear in court to defend his client's
action. In a strict sense there is no excuse for mail being
lost or misdirected or for a lawyer not attending to his
client's business or for any mistake for that matter.
All the Rule requires is that there be a legitimate reason
for the mistake.
See: Huntington Cab Co. v. American Fidelity &
Casualty Co., Inc., 4 F.R.D. 496; United States v. Mutual
Const. Corporation, 3 F.R.D. 227; Rawlins. v. Wilson, 187
P. (2d) 322; Bernards v. Grey, 218 P. (2d) 597; Brown
v. Beck, 169 P. (2d) 855; Friedrich v. Roland, 213 P. (2d)
423; Dinke v. Bowes, 176 P. (2d) 81; Reynolds v. Gladys
Belle Oil Co., 243 P. 576; Barney v. Platte Vall-ey Public
Power d!; Irrigation Dist., 23 N.W. (2d) 335.
Particular attention of the Court is invited to the
California case of Friedrich v. Roland, decided in 1950,
cited above, which involved a mistake not of an agent
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but of the defendant herself. She failed to answer because
when served with summons she believed she no longer
had any interest in the property involved. The reason
for her erroneous belief was the fact that she was unaware that a property settlement agreement she had
signed did not in fact convey her interest in certain community property. Just prior to the filing of her motion
she learned she did have an interest. The refusal of
the trial court to set aside the default judgment was.
reversed by the appellate court. The Court stated:
"S.ound policy favors the determination of
actions on the merits."

Freeman on Judgments) 5th Ed., Vol. 1, page 474,
summarizes the mistake cases as follows:
"ThQ grounds of mistake most frequently
relied upon for relief are in the fact of the service
of process, or in the date at which the party
served must appear, or at which the action is
set for trial. Because the lower courts exercise
a discretion with which the appellate courts are
loath to interfere, as well as from other causes,
there is not an entire harmony of decision upon
these subjects, but we think it a fair inference
from the reported cases that if the court is convinced that the alleged mistake was an honest
one .and was the sole cause of the moving party's
not being represented at the trial or not appearing in the action in due time, relief will be granted.''
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And again, at pages 494-5, it is stated:
··_..\.nd gTeater lenienev is shown in son1e cases
'vhere a p~rty is obliged to act through agents.
Thus relief 'Yas given to a rity \Yhere sunnnons
had neYer con1e to the knowledge of the city attorney because of the neglect or inadvertence of the
mayor or those in charge of his office."

In Utah Commercial Bank v. Trtttmbo, 17 Utah 198,
this Court stated :
.. The policy of the law is that every man shall
have his day in Court before judgment shall be
entered against him, and where a judgment by
default has been entered, and within the proper
time a good defense to the action in which the
judgment was rendered is made to ap.pear, and
it be shown that the default was entered through
excusable neglect or mistake, the default will be
vacated, and the judgment set aside to permit a
trial on the merits. It is true that ordinarily the
setting aside of a judgment by default rests within
the sound legal discretion of the court, and the
appellate court will not interfere, but where, as
in this case, it is made clearly to ap·pear that
there was such an abuse of discretion, through
inadvertence or otherwise, as to render the action
erroneous and unlawful, the appellate court will
control such discretion, and set aside the illegal
action. Such discretion does not confer upon the
court an arbitrary power beyond that of review.
It is an impartial legal discretion, which cannot
be employed to the injury of any subject, but
must be exercised fairly, reasonably, and in accordance with the established principles of law.
The power of the court to set aside judgments
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by default is recognized and conferred in section
3005, R. S. Utah, and should be liberally exercised, for the purpose of directing proceedings and
trying causes upon their substantial merits; and
where the circumstances which led to the default
are such as to cause the court to hesitate it is.
bet~er to resolve the doubt in favor of the 'application, so that a trial may be secured on the
merits."
The adjudicated cases and the new Rules clearly
show that the need for judicial repose must give ·way
to the overriding policy of the law which is that every
man is entitled to his day in Court and to a just trial
on the merits of his cause.
Defendants in this case, by timely motion, show good
cause why the judgment below should be set aside. They
have shown diligence, have filed affidavits of merits and
tendered an answer which if found true upon a trial of
the cause would constitute a complete defense to the
action. They likewise offer to reimburse plaintiffs for
the costs and expenses which plaintiffs have been put to
in connection with the default judgment here sought to
be set aside.
CONCLUSION
Either on the ground that necessary and indispensable parties have not been joined in the action or on the
ground that the Court below erred in holding Don Barr's
mistake to be inexcusable or on both grounds, defendants and Jay Larsen respectfully p.ray the Court to
reverse the orders and rulings of the Court below so
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that they may have their day in Court at a trial of the
cause upon the merits.
Respectfully submitted,

C. M. GILMOUR,
FRANI~ A. JOHNSON,
DEY, HOPPAUGH, MARK &
JOHNSON,
Attorneys for Defendoots and
Appellants,
903 Kearns Building,
Salt Lake City, Utah
CLYDE S. JOHNS.ON,
Attorney for Jay Larsen,
Appellant and Intervener,
Vernal, Utah

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

